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Southe ast  As i a
MA R T I N  R A M S T E D T
The collapse of the Soeharto regime has undermined
the three legitimatory pillars of the Indonesian state:
the much acclaimed economic development of the
country is thwarted; the alleged preoccupation of the
Indonesian government with economic and political
equity has been recognized as the rhetorical decorum
of Ôcrony-capitalismÕ; and the lauded socio-political
stability has finally erupted in social unrest and per-
turbation, gradually dissolving the Ôsocial glueÕ pro-
vided by IndonesiaÕs Ôcivil religionÕ, the p a n c a s i l a p h i-
losophy. The repressed ghosts of nationalist imagina-
tion Ð political Islam and the disruption of centre-pe-
riphery relations Ð walk again. Apart from gender, Ôre-
ligionÕ became an issue in the run for presidency. 
M u s l i m Ð H i n d u
R e l a t i o n s
in Contemporary
I n d o n e s i a
Ever since the independent, unitary state of
Indonesia came into being in 1950, Indonesi-
aÕs ÔHindusÕ have had to fight against cultur-
al and religious discrimination on the part of
the central government in general and the
Ministry of Religion, representing mainly the
interests of the Muslim majority, in particu-
lar. First of all, it was not until 1958 that ÔHin-
duismÕ was recognized as ÔreligionÕ by the
Ministry of Religion. Since religion was de-
fined as being a universal and monotheistic
creed, based on a holy book which had been
conceived by a holy prophet in divine revela-
tion, recognition was initially granted only to
Islam and Christianity. The various ÔanimistÕ
traditions throughout the Indonesian archi-
pelago were classified as primitive and su-
perstitious belief systems, which were des-
tined to be transformed into local variants of
the modern Indonesian culture by the mod-
ernizing policy of the Indonesian govern-
ment and by the spread of religion. The Bali-
nese immediately reacted to the threat of
being proselytized by either Islam or Christi-
anity by redefining the tenets of their tradi-
tional belief system, originally called ÔShiva-
Buddha-ReligionÕ, and by reforming those
aspects of their culture that were not in
keeping with the modernist requirements of
the Indonesian government. Having stream-
lined their theology and ritual practices ac-
cording to the definition of religion by the
Ministry of Religion, they succeeded in
achieving the recognition of ÔHinduismÕ in
1958. 
New order Hinduism
With the onset of SoehartoÕs Ônew orderÕ,
ÔHinduismÕ became the umbrella-institution
for various other local traditions (i.e. Aluk To
Dolo and AdaÕ Mappurondo of the SaÕdan-
and Mamasa-Toraja as well as the tradition of
the Towani Tolotang in South Sulawesi, Pe-
mena of the Karo-Batak, Kaharingan of the
Ngaju- and Luangan-Dayak in Central and
East Kalimantan) whose adherents have
turned to ÔHinduismÕ with the hope of being
able to continue their ritual practices under
the protection of a more tolerant religion.
The integration of these new ÔHindu sectsÕ, as
they are called, into ÔIndonesian HinduismÕ
has nurtured the prejudice against Hinduism
still prevailing among Muslims and Chris-
tians. Until today, Hinduism has frequently
been accused of being polytheistic and ani-
mistic, hence of not being a ÔreligionÕ, or at
least a religion equal to Islam and Christiani-
ty. During the Soeharto regime, IndonesiaÕs 6
million ÔHindusÕ were protected against at-
tempts at Muslim and Christian proselytizing
by the government party GOLKAR and by the
army both of which promoted Ôreligious tol-
eranceÕ as one tenet of the state ideology, the
so-called p a n c a s i l a philosophy. Since the fall
of Soeharto and the subsequent de-legitimi-
zation of GOLKAR, the army, and the p a n c a s i-
la philosophy, the non-Balinese ÔHindusÕ
have again become the target of Islamization
and Christianization.
Since October 1998, the sensitive rela-
tions between Indonesian Muslims and
ÔHindusÕ have suffered a further setback
from what has come to be known as the
ÔA.M. Saefuddin AffairÕ. The whole affair
started on 14 October 1998, when the Minis-
ter for Nutrition and Horticulture, A.M. Sae-
fuddin, who had then recently joined the
vanity fair of those competing for the Indo-
nesian presidency in the 15 November 1999
elections, was asked by a journalist to assess
his chances v i s -  - v i s Megawati Soekarnopu-
tri, the popular daughter of the charismatic
former president Soekarno. Megawati had
just won massive support as a presidential
candidate at the congress of the Fighting In-
donesian Democratic Party (Partai Demok-
rasi Indonesia, PDI, Perjuangan), taking
place in Bali from 8-10 October 1998. 
The ambitious minister boasted that his
chances against Megawati would be very
good, since he himself is male and a Muslim,
whereas Megawati is female and a Hindu,
insinuating that the Muslim majority of the
Indonesian people would not approve of a
Hindu president. 
When accusing the liberal Muslimah Meg-
awati of being Hindu, Saefuddin referred to
a photo which had been published in sever-
al Indonesian newspapers. It showed Mega-
wati joining the prayers in one of the Bali-
nese temples. This breach of orthodox Mus-
lim convention was hitherto considered to
be quite a normal act for Indonesian politi-
cians and bureaucrats visiting Bali. That it
was now made an issue by Saefuddin
aroused massive protest and demonstra-
tions in Bali. 
Saefuddin himself is a representative of the
more radical faction of Indonesian Islam. Be-
sides, he shared much common ground
with B.J. Habibie, the short-serving succes-
sor of Soeharto. Like Habibie, Saefuddin
studied engineering in Germany and is
hence also a member of the Union of Alum-
ni from German Universities (Perhimpunan
Alumni Jerman) and the Union of Indone-
sian Engineers (Persatuan Insinyur Indone-
sia). He is furthermore a member of the
Guiding Council of the Committee for the
Co-operation for Indonesian Muslim Board-
ing Schools (Majelis Pimpinan Badan Kerjas-
ama Pondok Pesantren Indonesia) and a
member of the Council of Experts of the As-
sociation of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals
(Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia,
CMI), which was headed by Habibie before
he became president. 
Both moderate and fierce critics of Sae-
fuddin in and outside Bali agreed that his
statement had unnecessarily dragged pri-
vate matters of religion and belief into the
political arena, even that he had selfishly
tried to use religion against his political ri-
val. Criticism differed, however, on whether
Saefuddin had scorned Hinduism in general
and whether he had therefore violated the
principle of religious tolerance prescribed
by the p a n c a s i l a, which is still supposed to
be the ideological basis of the Indonesian
s t a t e .
Hindu protests 
When, due to Balinese pressure, then
President Habibie agreed to demand an of-
ficial apology from his minister, matters be-
gan to escalate, for SaefuddinÕs apology
rang a rather contemptuous and insincere
note. In response to his half-hearted apolo-
gy, Bali went into strike and continuous
demonstration, demanding that Saefuddin
be removed from office and stand trial for
having endangered the national unity. Sev-
eral Balinese even went so far as to threaten
to call for an independent Balinese state
(Negara Bali Merdeka), should their de-
mands not be granted by Habibie. 
The demonstrations and strikes were ac-
tively supported by most segments of Bali-
nese society including representatives of
the tourist industry and a considerable
number of Muslims living in Bali. During the
demonstrations and strikes, every Hindu Ba-
linese wore white traditional clothing usual-
ly donned during prayers, rituals and cere-
monies. People even brought along some
musical instruments (b a l e g a n j u r), which are
normally used in ritual processions, and
sang ritual songs like traditional Balinese g e-
g u r i t a n and India-derived k i r t a n. Hundreds
of banners cursed A.M. Saefuddin and
threatened, for instance, to throw him into a
box together with pigs. The decorum of the
public protests revoked similar actions of
Balinese self-defence which took place at
the beginning of this century, i.e. the dra-
matic p u p u t a n or ritual self-destructive
fights against the Dutch colonizers. 
Smaller demonstrations also took place in
Jakarta, Bandung and Surabaya where there
are large numbers of Balinese students, gov-
ernment officials and businessmen. In the
other ÔHinduÕ areas in Indonesia, protest was
almost non-existent. There, the ÔHindusÕ be-
long to the politically, economically and ed-
ucationally marginalized minority even
among their own respective ethnic groups,
the majority of which have already either
converted to Christianity or Islam. Hence,
they often do not dare to protest against a
kind of cultural racism which they have
come to regard as almost normal. The Bali-
nese, on the other hand, who have devel-
oped a strong affluent middle class, have a
very strong Hindu identity. And it is their re-
ligious symbols that have frequently be-
come the target of religious defamation. Re-
cent examples are the scandalous photo of
a Balinese offering containing a golf ball
which was published in the brochure B a l i
Kini in order to advertise the respective
tourist facilities of the island, or the plans to
build a huge Garuda statue in the south of
Bali in order to greet tourists arriving by
plane. In 1995, Bali-wide demonstrations at-
tempted in vain to prevent the construction
of the Bali Nirwana Beach Resort right next
to the famous Tanah Lot Temple. Since that
time, protest against (Muslim) Javanese sell-
ing Balinese religion to the tourist industry
has never really subsided. 
In spite of Balinese agitation, Habibie
eventually refrained from removing A.M.
Saefuddin from office. The president closed
the whole affair after another official apolo-
gy had been forwarded by the recalcitrant
minister. Meanwhile, some prominent u l a-
m a and Muslim intellectuals had urged the
Indonesian Council of Islamic Theologians
(Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) to issue a f a t-
w a on whether a woman can or cannot be-
come president. On 7 November 1998, the
same day that Saefuddin apologized for the
second time, an Islamic Congress (Kongres
Umat Islam) voted against women becom-
ing president or vice president. On 1 June
1999, this vote was officially expressed in
something stronger than a f a t w a, i.e. in a so-
called amanat Ð a mandate of the Indone-
sian Muslims represented by the Indonesian
Council of Islamic Theologians. During the
actual elections for presidency in October
1999, it became apparent that the Muslim
vote prevented a woman Ð at the least for
the time being Ð from becoming president
of Indonesia, notwithstanding her large
popular support. '
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